1 1 0 live up to its promises. In particular, his film examples do not live up to the promises of the more theoretical parts of his book.
Parts 1 and 2 of this review give a descriptive account of Frampton's book, followed by a critical evaluation in part 3.
. Fr ampt on's A genda
Daniel Frampton's book Filmosophy is announced on the book cover as 'a manifesto for a radically new way of understanding cinema'. He claims that his work is 'a study of film as thinking, and contains a theory of both film-being and film form' (6). In Frampton's view, the events in a film and the way they are presented are best understood as acts of thinking performed by the film itself. Film is a conceptualised as a 'filmind' (9) whose kind of thinking is not to be confused with 'human' thinking. Frampton explicitly rejects an anthropomorphic understanding of this 'filmind' (see 73 f., 46 ff.) and claims that his analogy between film and mind is a functional one (see 7). It is supposed to allow Frampton to describe film (any film) as an organic whole which should also be talked and written about as such. Consequently, he rejects rigid analytic distinctions between, for example, film style and narration, as long as they break up this organicity of the film. In other words:
his book is also another attack on approaches to film writing and analysis inspired by the formalist tradition. Frampton's terminology is not supposed to give empirical descriptions of films, of their nature or genesis, but rather provides 'a conceptual understanding of the origins of film's actions and events. […] Filmosophy conceptualizes film as an organic intelligence: a 'film being' thinking about the characters and subjects in the film' (7). Filmosophy is directed against theories of narration which allegedly attempt to identify an ''external' force' such as an (invisible) narrator as the originator of the film's discourse (ibid.). Rather, 'it is the film that is steering its own (dis)course. The filmind is 'the film itself'' (7). Filmosophical terminology is supposed to put a film spectator into the right frame of mind for the film experience: Schmerheim, Philipp (2008) […] it is a decision by filmgoers whether to use this concept when experiencing a film. The film is just light and sound. I am simply arguing that filmgoers should use the concept of the filmind, in order to experience film as a fully expressive medium. (99) Frampton's 'filmind' proposes a philosophical thesis as well as it gives a criticism of the current state of film studies. The philosophical thesis is that films can follow lines of intellectual inquiry that traditional forms of thinking, which work predominantly qua language, are unable to follow. Filmosophy thus claims that films can philosophize, and can do so with their own means of expression which extend beyond philosophy as a linguistic activity. The criticism of the status quo in film studies that Frampton puts forward is that approaches which separate a given film into different parts (such as form and style, editing and camera movement) which are subsequently analysed, distort an accurate understanding of a film and of the reproduction of the actual experience of (seeing and hearing a) film. Instead, film should be understood as an organic whole in which all parts interrelate with each other, and which also causes such an organic impression on a film spectator. For Frampton, operational distinctions between film form and film style distort an understanding of how film works (on us as filmgoers). Frampton argues that his conception of film facilitates such an 'organic' film experience, 'because style is tied to meaning with natural, thoughtful, human terms of intention (by the filmind) ' (149) . This is because the 'concept of film-thinking [which is performed by the filmind] bonds form to content by making style part of the action' (8).
Frampton also criticizes an undue focus on narrational aspects of film in filmphilosophical studies in disadvantage of specifically cinematic means of expression: 'So much writing within the area of 'film and philosophy' simply ignores cinematics and concentrates on stories and character motivations' (9).
3 For Frampton, film is a kind of nonconceptual thinking, and herein also lies the philosophical potential of film: 'Film possibly contains a whole new system of thought, a new episteme' (11).
Filmosophy is not primarily concerned with the analysis of a given film, but rather with the 'personal affects of film -how film affects us directly, emotionally' (2). The influence of (Sobchack's and Merleau-Ponty's) phenomenological approaches redirects
Frampton's attention to questions of spectatorship (or, in his terms, of the 'filmgoing Schmerheim, Philipp (2008) Frampton argues that
[t]he movement of Filmosophy is away from seeing film form as abstractly relating to meaning, to seeing film form as the drama of the film: the film does not carry or mean confusion, it becomes confusion, it inhabits the affects and emotions and concepts we receive in the filmgoing experience.
[…] The organicism of the filmind reveals cuts, edits -shifts in images -as the active thought of the whole film. (131) As a consequence of such an 'organic' understanding, each film has to be understood as a whole, it is not possible to just concentrate on a particular scene.
To sum up, if I understand correctly, Frampton wants to make plausible the following theses: film is 1) not just a sum of its structural parts, but should be understood as a quasiorganic, autonomous entity which 2) performs its own kind of thinking, a film-thinking, which transcends anthropomorphic conceptions of thoughts and also cannot be compared to them. This opens up 3) the possibility that film contains a new 'episteme'. Because film is conceived of as an organic whole, all elements of a film become of importance and have to Schmerheim, Philipp (2008) (22), and that filmic thinking thus is not an analogical, but a poetic concept.
In chapter 2, Frampton moves from theorists that link films to the mind to accounts which posit film as a special kind of entity, a being he throughout calls 'film-being'. This is first only to be understood as a 'general term for what we understand to be the origin(ator)
of the images and sounds we experience' (27). Frampton explores and ultimately dismisses several traditional ways of understanding film as a being, e.g. as expressive of a filmmaker's though, 'as camera 'I' or virtual creator, as ghostly or absent author, or as some kind of narratological or post-narratological being.' (11). Instead of trying to find a sort of unifying Frampton wants to 'bring the conceptualisation of film-being back 'into' the film' (38). I. e., the film itself gives us all we need to form a proper philosophical understanding of it.
Conceptually, film is, according to Frampton, is its own creator, 'not from a 'point' of view, but from a realm, a no-place, that still gives us some things and not others' (38).
In chapter 3, 'film phenomenology', Frampton argues that film, not only spectators, in ways to be specified has its own perception of its film world, too. He asks in what ways a film being (be its exact nature as it may) could possibly 'experience' its film world. He examines and criticises Vivian Sobchack's film phenomenology for its alleged anthropomorphism: 'It is limiting to talk about film form in terms of our perceptual capabilities -film can do more than us, differently to us.
[…] Film is not a human-like mind, it is, uniquely, a filmind.' (47). Sobchack's account is also criticised as limiting for our understanding of (the philosophical possibilities) of film (46). In chapter 5, Frampton argues that film should be conceived as a performative entity: 'Film does thinking, rather than just provoking thinking. Film-thinking is immanent to the film' (95). He distinguishes three kinds of film-thinking: basic film-thinking, formal film-thinking, and fluid film-thinking: basic film-thinking is the 'basic design of the filmworld (black and white or colour, frame ratio)', formal film-thinking is 'the addition of traditional formal elements (framing, movement, shifts)', and fluid film-thinking is 'the recreation of the film-world itself (special effects, image morphings, and so forth)' (all on 83).
The first kind of film-thinking thus somehow sets out the framework of the whole film, while formal film-thinking seems to concern everything that can be done with the camera within the boundaries of the established framework (for an example of Frampton's visualist rhetoric of film-thinking, see 90). Fluid film-thinking, then, is directly borrowed from the post-production process: It is expressed through the manipulation of the images we see, for instance through morphing, but fluid film-thinking also seems to be the explicit breakup of linear story patterns (see 88 ff.).
Chapter 7 on 'film-thinking' elaborates on certain of these specifically filmic ways of thinking, which are, for example, constituted by 'the loosely defined basic fields of film composition (image, colour, sound, frame, movement and edit-shifts)' (116). Frampton argues that 'the move of filmosophy is in crafting an integral understanding of how these image forms work inseparably with (as) the drama of film' (117). Again, the reader is unmistakably made aware that the hidden enemy is the Bordwell-camp. However, in chapter 8 on the 'filmgoer' Frampton applies Filmosophy to spectatorship and elaborates how his approach might 'reconfigure our understanding of the encounter between film and filmgoer' (148 
Frampton also tries to impose a filmosophical understanding on the proceedings of writing about film and the filmgoing-experience: 'Filmosophy attempts to organically unite 'form and content' in the filmgoer's thought, and the argument concerning film writing is parallel: the form of your writing is also its content' (179). The book concludes with a chapter on 'Filmosophy', where its assumptions are related to movements in the history of philosophy, particularly from Nietzsche over Heidegger to Derrida, and with a 'conclusion' which also explicitly relates Filmosophy to current developments of digital and experimental cinema.
. Cr it ic ism
Frampton offers an interesting account of conceiving of the philosophical potential of cinema. His Filmosophy proceeds in the right direction in that it tries to put accounts of spectatorial experience of film first and analysis second. He also sees clearly that an analysis always has to bear in mind the whole film and not just aspects or parts of it.
His attempts to locate the philosophical potential of film in its performative character (in this he is close to Mulhall's conception of film as 'philosophy in action'), and in its possibilities to transcend hitherto known ways of thinking, are also right on the mark. 5 I also think that Frampton is right in emphasising cinema's potential to transform reality and thereby offer new perspectives on it. There is a venerable tradition which elaborates on this point -thinkers such as Rudolf Arnheim (for whom film's transformative and not merely reproductive character is the reason for its status as an art form) and Stanley Cavell, who describes film as 'a succession of automatic world projections' (Cavell 1979: 72) he expands Cavell's definition of film. These thoughts of the real are, on the one hand, the thought of the filmgoer, in whom is induced, in the best case, an expanded conception of (the possibilities of) reality. But Frampton also conceives of these thought of reality as the thoughts the film itself has on the (film) reality it produces. This idea is interesting, but, however, I do not clearly see how Frampton can clearly distinguish such an approach from the 'anthropomorphic' conceptions of film he so eagerly criticises. It seems to me that his attempt to identify a single conceptual source for understanding film (the filmind as a kind of film being) leads him on those trodden paths left by attempts to build first philosophies and unifying theories.
His intention to redirect the attention of film-philosophy scholars towards the study of specifically cinematic rather than only narrational philosophic aspects of film is also on the right track. In fact, there do not seem to be many studies out there which specifically focus on the philosophical potential of cinematic means of expression which bypass narratological aspects. I agree with Frampton that what makes cinema philosophically interesting in the first place is its ability to 'think' in non-conceptual ways. Studies that primarily focus on philosophical aspects of the stories that narration films rely on thus ignore the really interesting philosophical aspects of film.
However, I think that in his bold criticism of so-called 'technicist approaches'
Frampton conflates post-viewing film analyses with accounts of a film viewing experience.
Of course the immediate experience of watching a film does not necessarily need to be sustained by background knowledge about how exactly this and that scene came to be.
But, looking at the examples of 'filmosophical reviews' to be found in Frampton's book, it strikes me that such reviews do not in any way reveal deeper insights into the film than, say, 'technicist' reviews: Both are sadly one-sided (the question whether there really are purely technicist reviews put aside He also tries to do away with excessive occupation with the technical gadgets of digital cinema:
[T]he interest lies not in the particular technical method, nor in exactly how a particular film mixes recorded and digital for example, but in what kind of filmthinking these forms usher in. Thus, in describing these films, the explication of effects and digital moments should be avoided -writing should simply refer to the thinking: the feelings and questions and motives of the forms. For example, for the writer of filmosophical reviews, The Matrix is on one plane of film-reality: there are no 'recorded' and 'digitally animated' parts, just one level of film-world. (205) But, thus my objection goes, does our particular film experience not also depend on the extent to which our eyes and ears are trained by the technical cinematic possibilities The puzzling aspect of Frampton's book is that his theoretical remarks are often very clear and understandable, his summaries sometimes brilliantly concise (such as the parts on Deleuze, see 61 ff.), while his film examples strike me as rather fuzzy and vague. There is rarely more than one paragraph on each film, even in chapter 7, which provides many short examples but only few detailed discussions of single films. Perceptive accounts of a film intermingle with statements which read like loose associations rather than precise accounts (be it of the film itself or the film experience). He might convey a general idea about a given film, but he is either unable or unwilling to give us specifics. It is probably the latter, because he writes: For the concepts to grow in the reader they must remain loose in meaning, context-dependent and pragmatic (each film has differing thoughts).
[…] The concepts and attentions of Filmosophy are not intended to provide complete interpretations, but can be used as a first step, a route to larger interpretations. assumes that 'we are already well suited to understand film' (175) and thus does not see the need for a language which would provide a better understanding. Instead of using the language of those who produce the film, it seems, he wants us to speak the language of the film itself -and because of this, following his conception of film as a thinking entity, the rhetoric of [film's] various forms can be sliced from the languages of thinking (questioning, comparing, belief, passion, reasoning, love, empathy, imagining) . A descriptive term should not wound the film, should not cut the film's surface to reveal its technological workings, but should open-up the image to reveal its thinking, its belief about the people and objects it has gained.
It is interesting to think of film as a thinking entity (instead of a medium used by others to do thinking), but again I do not see how Frampton escapes his own objection of anthropomorphism.
Frampton criticises that 'much film writing not only uses technicist terminology but also stumbles through crude metaphors when it attempts to link form to meaning' (174). It seems that Frampton approach is inspired by an imaginary conflict between advocates of a scientified field of the humanities on the one side and the inheritors of German romanticism, on the other. It is the same futile battle between Snow's two cultures again, this time repeated within the humanities itself. For one thing, I do not think that the stark dichotomy between the two camps has any empirical justification. Of course, a completely technicist rhetoric is unable to tell us anything about the specific performativity of film or film experience, just as an anatomy book will never tell us anything about love. But, if I ever happened to end up in surgery in the wake of a bad car accident, I believe I will greatly appreciate the anatomic knowledge and other technical possibilities available to present-day medicine.
The enterprise of an academic film philosophy needs both aspects which Frampton contrasts: the 'technicist' approach which is able to describe the actual instruments by which a film is constructed and the more or less general cognitive predispositions in a filmgoer on the one hand, and a 'poetic rhetoric' which is possibly more suited to describe Schmerheim, Philipp (2008) 
